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Judge Richard Cudahy 's dissenting opinion in the 1993 trade dress case,
Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., dealt with the importance of the "right to copy "
unpatented designs. This Essay argues that this opinion foreshadowed the
Supreme Court's recent shift away from an overly simplistic view of intellectual
property as the sole engine of innovation to a renewed understanding of the
interplay between property and competition as innovation drivers.
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Introduction
I am extremely pleased to have this opportunity to contribute a reflection
on Judge Richard Cudahy's intellectual property jurisprudence to this tribute
issue. There is much that could be said about the way that Judge Cudahy's
corpus of intellectual property opinions reflects the qualities I observed in him
during my clerkship and continue to admire, including his keen intellect,
commitment to justice and fairness, and deep insight into the way law works on
the ground. In this brief space, rather than attempt an overview, I will focus on
his important 1993 dissent in the trademark case of Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc.I
t Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. During the 1994-95 term, I had the
great privilege of clerking for Judge Cudahy on the United States Courts of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit. Clerking for Judge Cudahy was a truly wonderful experience and I am honored to contribute to
this tribute issue. I acknowledge the generous support of the Filomen D'Agostino and Max E. Greenberg
Research Fund during the writing of this Essay and am grateful to Mark McKenna for helpful comments
and discussion. I also acknowledge Stephen Elkind for able research assistance.
1. 12 F.3d 632 (7th Cir. 1993).
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Judge Cudahy's dissents are a very important part of his jurisprudence,2
providing perhaps the clearest windows into his views.3 The Kohler dissent was
prescient, foreshadowing a turn by the Supreme Court in this century away
from an overly simplistic view of intellectual property as the engine of
innovation, which often prevailed in the 1990s, to a renewed understanding of
the interplay between intellectual property and competition as innovation
drivers.4
In Kohler,5 a Seventh Circuit majority concluded that trade dress coverage
for unpatented product designs presented no conflict with the patent system.
Judge Cudahy penned a well-known dissent,7 later described by commentators
as "spirited,"8 "elegant[]," 9 and "forceful[]."' 0 He argued that product design
could not be the subject of trademark protection because of the potential for
such protection to interfere with patent law's careful balance between exclusive
rights and the "right to copy" unpatented goods." To illustrate the point, he
cited a trademark on a round beach towel design as a "horrible example[] of
allowing federal trademark registration to substitute for the grant of a design
patent."l2 The different conclusions reached by Judge Cudahy and his fellow
panel members reflect different understandings of the relationship between
innovation and competition. As I argue below, recent Supreme Court cases
suggest that Judge Cudahy got it right. When trade dress protection interferes
with the right to copy, it interferes with innovation policy, and hence with
patent law's realm, because it distorts the competitive baseline, where
"ordinary creativity" responds to market demand, 13 upon which patent law's
incentives build.14
2. For a statistical analysis of Judge Cudahy's separate opinions, see Richard A. Posner, A
Hear/elt, But Partly Statistical, Salute to Judge Richard D. Cudahy, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 355 (2012).
3. That said, I make no representation that Judge Cudahy will agree with everything I say here,
or even with everything about the way I read his Kohler dissent. I suppose that judges must be surprised
quite regularly by the things that readers see in what they write!
4. See, e.g., FTC, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND
PATENT LAW AND POLICY 5 (2003) (recognizing that "questionable patents are a significant competitive
concern and can harm innovation"), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf
5. 12 F.3d at 644.
6. See, e.g., Margreth Barrett, Consolidating the Diffuse Paths to Trade Dress Functionality:
Encountering TrafFix on the Way to Sears, 61 WASH & LEE L. REV. 79, 145 n.287 (2004) (referring to
the dissent as "famous").
7. Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 644 (7th Cir. 1993) (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
8. David S. Welkowitz, Trade Dress and Patent-The Dilemma of Confusion, 30 RUTGERS
L.J. 289, 305 n.99 (1999).
9. David W. Opderbeck, An Economic Perspective on Product Configuration Trade Dress, 24
SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 327, 347 (2000).
10. Barrett, supra note 6, at 158 n.287.
11. 12 F.3d at 651.
12. Id. at 647.
13. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 420-21 (2007).




In 1993, the tide of intellectual property protection was rising." The
previous year had seen the inauguration of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, a court with national jurisdiction over patent cases and an
implicit mission to increase both the availability and the strength of patent
protection.16 In 1994, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property was negotiated, locking in "minimum standards" 8 for copyright,
patent, and trademark protection in signatory countries around the world.'9 By
1996, legislative efforts were under way to provide intellectual property
coverage for databases, which for the most part are not covered by copyright. 20
In 1998, Congress strengthened copyright coverage by passing both the
Copyright Term Extension Act 2 1 and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.2 2
That same year, the Federal Circuit interpreted patentable subject matter
extremely broadly, ruling that business methods, long believed to be outside the
scope of patent coverage, could be patented.23
Trademark law was not immune from this trend. In 1992, the Supreme
Court had issued its opinion in Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.,24 making
it easier to obtain trade dress coverage. In 1995, the Court held, in Qualitex Co.
v. Jacobson Products Co., that color could be registered as a trademark.25
Increasingly, trademarks came to be viewed as the property of trademark
owners, rather than merely a means to assist consumers in identifying the
26sources of goods. In 1995, reflecting this view, Congress passed the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act,27 which expanded federal trademark coverage for
"famous" marks. 28
15. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law,
1900-2000, 88 CALIF. L. REv. 2187 (2000).
16. Id. at 2224.
17. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF
THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994).
18. See Overview: The TRIPS Agreement, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/tripse/intel2_e.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2012).
19. See, e.g., J.H. Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property
Protection Under the TRIPS Component of the WTO Agreement, 20 INT'L LAW. 345 (1995).
20. These efforts were eventually abandoned around the turn of the millennium. See, e.g.,
Mark Davison, Database Protection: Lessons from Europe, Congress, and WIPO, 57 CASE W. RES. L.
REv. 829, 845-50 (2007).
21. Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.
(2006)).
22. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified in scattered sections of 17 and 28
U.S.C. (2006)).
23. State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
24. 505 U.S. 763, 767 (1992).
25. 514 U.S. 159, 160-61 (1995).
26. See, e.g., Mark Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108
YALE L.J. 1687, 1687-88 (1999).
27. Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125, 1127 (2006)).
28. See Clarisa Long, Dilution, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 1029, 1034-35 (2006).
389
Yale Journal on Regulation
In light of the expansive tenor of the times, Judge Cudahy's defense of the
right to copy unpatented goods certainly must have seemed to be swimming
against the tide. Over the longer run, however, Judge Cudahy's Kohler dissent
has proven prophetic. Though the Supreme Court has not gone so far as to
adopt Judge Cudahy's contention that product design is per se incognizable
under trademark law, the Court has restricted the availability of trade dress
coverage for product designs precisely because of the importance of the right to
copy unpatented designs.29
Part I of this Essay provides background to the dispute between Judge
Cudahy and the Kohler majority. Part II argues that the majority opinion and
Judge Cudahy's dissent reflect different views of the relationship between
competition and innovation and of the importance of the right to copy. Part III
argues that the Supreme Court's trade dress jurisprudence since the turn of this
century increasingly has vindicated Judge Cudahy's views, recognizing that
competition and intellectual property are intertwined means to promote
innovation. Part IV concludes.
I. The Context for the Kohler v. Moen Debate
Kohler involved a dispute between competitors in the market for kitchen
fixtures, which began with Kohler filing an opposition to Moen's federal
trademark registrations for the appearance of its single-handle kitchen faucets. 3 0
Eventually, the dispute arrived before the Seventh Circuit, posing the question:
Are product designs registrable as trademarks? 31 Judge Coffey's majority
opinion said yes,32 while Judge Cudahy dissented at length. To understand the
significance of that dissent, a little background on trademark's functionality
doctrine and on the right to copy unpatented items is in order.
29. Recent patent law cases also reflect an emphasis on the balance between patenting and
competition in driving innovation. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3229, 3252 (2010)
(noting, in part of the opinion joined by three Justices, that if the bar for patentable subject matter were
insufficiently high, "patent examiners and courts could be flooded with claims that would put a chill on
creative endeavor and dynamic change," while four other Justices emphasized the "careful balance
between the need to promote innovation and the recognition that imitation and refinement through
imitation are both necessary to invention itself and the very lifeblood of a competitive economy"
(citations omitted)); KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417, 427 (2007) (noting the
importance of "design incentives and other market forces" in driving innovation and that "advances,
once part of our shared knowledge, define a new threshold from which innovation starts once more. And
as progress beginning from higher levels of achievement is expected in the normal course, the results of
ordinary innovation are not the subject of exclusive rights under the patent laws. Were it otherwise
patents might stifle, rather than promote, the progress of useful arts").







A. Trademark Law and the Functionality Doctrine
The traditional raison d'6tre of trademark law is to promote a well-
functioning market by ensuring that consumers can rely on company reputation
in their purchasing decisions. 34 To avoid confusing consumers, a trademark
must be "distinctive," either inherently or through an acquired "secondary
meaning," as a source signifier in consumers' minds.35
The umbrella of trademark law now covers a wide array of signs and
symbols, well beyond the simple product or company name or logo. Trade
dress may involve either product packaging36 or, as in Kohler, aspects of the
good itself, such as color, form, and design.37 In Two Pesos, decided shortly
before Kohler was argued, the Court had held that, in principle, the trade dress
reflected in the motif of a restaurant could be inherently distinctive. The Court
also expressed concern that small startup companies might not have time to
build up secondary meaning before their trade dress was copied by
competitors.
Because trademark rights necessarily impinge on uses that others might
want to make of words, symbols, and designs, trademark law has developed
various limiting doctrines. For example, a general name for a type of good
cannot be a trademark. If a trademark comes, over time, to stand in the minds
of consumers for a type of product rather than a particular source (as happened,
for example, to "aspirin"39) it may become "generic" and lose its
enforceability. 4 0 While trademarks facilitate a competitive market by providing
information about company reputation, the genericism doctrine facilitates a
market by ensuring that all purveyors of goods are able to use ordinary
41language to tell consumers about their products.
Trade dress protection also has the potential to constrain the competitive
market. A product's design often makes it desirable to consumers for reasons
unrelated to the product's source. The tension between product design's
potential role as a source identifier and its inherent value to consumers has been
recognized for more than one hundred years and underlies the requirement of
34. See, for example, Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right: Fragile
Theory or Fait Accompli?, 54 EMORY L.J. 461, 466-71 (2005), for one of many discussions of this point.
35. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 210-11 (2000).
36. See, e.g., id. at 215 (discussing trade dress as involving both "product packaging" and
"product design").
37. Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 651 n.Il (7th Cir. 1993).
38. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 775-76 (1992).
39. Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
40. See, e.g., Park 'n Fly v. Dollar Park & Fly, 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985); Kellogg Co. v. Nat'1
Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 116-17 (1938).
41. See, e.g., Deven R. Desai & Sandra L. Rierson, Confronting the Genericism Conundrum,
28 CARDoZO L. REV. 1789, 1810 (2007) (discussing the origins and purposes of the doctrine of
genericism).
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"non-functionality."42 Rather than deprive consumers of a competitive market
for functional design features, the law forces producers to find nonfunctional
means to mark product source.
Despite the doctrine's deep roots, courts have struggled to define what it
means for product design to be functional. Ten years prior to Kohler, in Inwood
Laboratories v. Ives Laboratories, the Supreme Court explained that "a product
feature is functional if it is essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it
affects the cost or quality of the article."4 3 The Supreme Court did not return to
the question of functionality until after Kohler was decided.
B. The Right To Copy Unpatented Product Configurations
In 1964, the Supreme Court issued two seminal opinions concerning the
right to copy unpatented product designs.44 The cases involved light fixtures
that were covered by design and utility patents. Despite invalidating the
patents, the district court had enjoined the defendants under state unfair
competition law from copying the fixtures. The Supreme Court unanimously
held that the state laws were incompatible with federal patent policy, because
"[t]o forbid copying would interfere with the federal policy, found in Article I,
Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution and in the implementing federal statutes,
of allowing free access to copy whatever the federal patent and copyright laws
leave in the public domain." 4 5 The Court found as insufficient to "furnish a
basis for . . . prohibiting the actual acts of copying and selling" the following
facts:
[t]hat an article copied from an unpatented article could be made in some other way, that the
design is "nonfunctional" and not essential to the use of either article, that the configuration of
the article copied may have a "secondary meaning" which identifies the maker to the trade, or
that there may be "confusion" among purchasers.
46
In 1989, the Supreme Court again struck down state law protection for
unpatented product designs in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,47
which involved a statute barring the unauthorized duplication of vessel hull
designs using direct molding. The Court reaffirmed that "the efficient operation
of the federal patent system depends upon substantially free trade in publicly
42. See, e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Story of Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co.:
Breakfast with Brandeis (Trademarks and Unfair Competition), in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES
220, 228-29 (Jane C. Ginsburg & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss eds., 2006).
43. 456 U.S. 844, 851 n.10 (1982).
44. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237-38 (1964); Sears, Roebuck
& Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231-32 (1964). The Supreme Court's endorsement of the right to
copy the subject matter of an expired patent traces back through Kellogg at least to Singer
Manufacturing Co. v. June Manufacturing Co., 163 U.S. 169, 185 (1896).
45. Compco, 376 U.S. at 237-38.
46. Id. at 238.




known, unpatented design and utilitarian conceptions"4 and that unpatented
concepts "provide the baseline of free competition upon which the patent
system's incentive to creative effort depends." 49 It emphasized the interplay
between the patent system and the competitive market, observing that:
The attractiveness of [the patent] bargain, and its effectiveness in inducing creative effort and
disclosure of the results of that effort, depend almost entirely on a backdrop of free
competition in the exploitation of unpatented designs and innovations. . . . [F]ree exploitation
of ideas will be the rule, to which the protection of a federal patent is the exception.s5
The Court highlighted the role copying plays in innovation:
The duplication of boat hulls and their component parts may be an essential part of innovation
in the field of hydrodynamic design. . . . Reverse engineering of chemical and mechanical
articles in the public domain often leads to significant advances in technology. . . . Moreover,
. . . the competitive reality of reverse engineering may act as a spur to the inventor, creating an
incentive to develop inventions that meet the rigorous requirements of patentability.5 1
In an opinion upholding a similar statute, the Court took issue with the
Federal Circuit's reference to copiers as "unscrupulous,"52 noting that copying
unpatented functional attributes is "legitimate competitive activity."5 In a final
blow, the Court was "troubled" by and found "puzzling" the Federal Circuit's
statement that the patent laws say "nothing about the right to copy," 54
emphasizing that "[fjor almost 100 years it has been well established that in the
case of an expired patent, the federal patent laws do create a federal right to
'copy and to use'."5 Notwithstanding its ringing endorsement of the right to
copy, the Court stressed that its precedent should not be read to "prohibit the
States from regulating the deceptive simulation of trade dress or the tortious
appropriation of private information" entirely.56
II. The Kohler Majority Opinion and Judge Cudahy's Dissent:
A Dispute over the Relationship Between Competition and Innovation
In 1985, prior to its opinion in Kohler, the Seventh Circuit considered
product-design trade dress in W. T. Rogers Co. v. Keene,57 which involved a
"molded plastic stacking office tray." The court first concluded that, as long as
non-functionality was required, there was no conflict between product-design
48. Id. at 156.
49. Id.
50. Id. at l51.
51. Id. at 161.
52. Id. at 163 (quoting Interpart Corp. v. Italia, 777 F.2d 678, 685 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
53. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 164 (1989).
54. Id. at 164-65 (quoting Interpart, 777 F.2d at 685).
55. Id. at 164.
56. Id. at 154.
57. 778 F.2d 334, 337 (7th Cir. 1985).
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trade dress and patent policy: "The trademark owner has an indefinite term of
protection, it is true, but in an infringement suit must also prove secondary
meaning and likelihood of confusion, which the owner of a design patent need
not do; there is therefore no necessary inconsistency between the two modes of
protection."" Turning to the functionality doctrine, the court reasoned that
certain product-design features, such as the shape of a football, are ineligible
for trademark coverage because they are such an integral part of what makes
the product attractive to consumers that a seller cannot compete without them.
Functionality thus should preclude trade dress coverage if "the design feature is
so important to the value of the product to consumers that continued trademark
protection would deprive them of competitive alternatives."59 If there were
enough alternatives available, there was no functionality problem.60
Kohler provided an opportunity for the Seventh Circuit to revisit the issue
of trade dress protection for product design in light of the intervening Supreme
Court opinions in Bonito Boats and Two Pesos. In Kohler, the majority
reaffirmed the eligibility of product design for trade dress coverage, rejecting
arguments that trade dress protection of product designs (1) conflicts with the
patent system61 and (2) is anticompetitive, 2 while Judge Cudahy dissented on
both grounds.63 The two opinions reflected very different perspectives on the
relationship between trademark law and the patent system.
A. The Majority Opinion
At issue in Kohler was the interpretation of the Lanham Act in light of the
potential conflict between trade dress protection for product configurations and
patent policy.6 4 However, the majority opinion never really engaged with this
question. While pointing to the "fundamental rule" that statutes be construed,
"if possible, in harmony with the Constitution and other applicable statutes,"
the majority brushed aside the argument that the Constitution requires
unpatented designs to be freely available for copying, once they are disclosed
to the public.6 5 The majority confined the relevance of Sears, Compco, and
Bonito Boats, to laws that "approximate the sweeping, perpetual patent-like
state statutes that the Supreme Court found impermissible in [those cases]." 66
58. Id. at 337.
59. Id. at 347.
60. Id.
61. Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 642 (7th Cir. 1993).
62. Id. at 643-44.
63. Id. at 644 (Cudahy, J., dissenting),
64. Id. at 633.





According to the majority, trademark protection for product
configurations does not "undermine[] product development"67; while "[p]atents
encourage the type of innovation that advances the progress of 'Science and the
useful Arts,"' trademark law promotes "[i]nnovation in product design and
marketing for the purpose of enhancing producer identity."6 Comparing the
policy justifications and doctrinal elements of trademark and patent protection,
the majority concluded that "a product's different qualities can be protected
simultaneously, or successively, by more than one of the statutory means for
protection of intellectual property."6 The court then asserted, without analysis,
that there is no conflict between trade dress and patent protection. 70
The majority also dismissed Kohler's competition argument, relying on
statements in Two Pesos that the functionality doctrine's role was to "assure
that competition will not be stifled by the exhaustion of a limited number of
trade dresses."71 Because Moen's design would not be "found in all or most
brands of the product even if no producer had any desire to have his brand
mistaken for that of another," 72 the court concluded that others could compete
by offering other types of faucet designs.7 3 Though Two Pesos mentioned
neither patents nor monopolies, the majority interpreted it to imply that
traditional trademark principles are sufficient to "avert the threat of a perpetual
trademark 'monopoly."' 74
The majority opinion viewed patent and trademark as "distinct areas of
law"75  addressing distinct concerns: promoting invention and aiding
competition, respectively. From this perspective, patent law creates islands of
exclusivity but has little interest in the sea of competition surrounding them. As
long as trade dress protection of product designs is not "the equivalent of
impermissible perpetual patent protection,"76 it is not a problem that trade dress
protection provides some degree of exclusive rights to unpatented product
configurations. Such rights may or may not add to the innovation incentives
provided by the patent system, but they do not interfere with the patent
system's goals. Competition, by contrast, is the purview of trademark law,
where exclusivity becomes problematic only if it removes so many options
from competitors that sufficient economic substitutes are no longer available to
maintain a competitive marketplace.
67. Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 643 (7th Cir. 1993).
68. Id. at 643.
69. Id. at 638.
70. Id. at 644.
71. Id. at 642 (quoting Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 775 (1992)).
72. Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 643 (7th Cir. 1993) (quoting W.T. Rogers v. Keene,
778 F.2d 334, 339 (7th Cir. 1985)).
73. Id. at 643.
74. Id. at 642.
75. Id. at 639.
76. Id. at 643.
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B. Judge Cudahy's Dissent: A Different View of the Relationship Between
Intellectual Property and Competition
In dissent, Judge Cudahy took a very different view of the relationship
between competition and the patent system. Urging renewed attention to
"fundamentals," he argued that:
[T]he constitutional right to copy after a patent expires or in the absence of a patent is the
reciprocal of the constitutional right to prohibit copying for a limited term under the Patent
Clause. To ignore this principle is to permit perpetual monopolies on product ideas or
particular product designs and to inhibit product development.77
Because they were grounded in this fundamental principle, Sears,
Compco, and Bonito Boats were relevant precedent, even though they
concerned state unfair competition law rather than the Federal Lanham Act.
Moreover, Judge Cudahy argued, the policy that requires that a patented
invention move into the public domain at the expiration of the patent's term
applies equally to the subjects of utility and design patents, independent of
whether they are "essential" to competition.
As Judge Cudahy put it, the right to copy is "absolutely essential to the
successful long-term operation of a free and competitive economy" 79 because
"[t]o ignore [the right to copy] is to permit perpetual monopolies on product
ideas or particular product designs and to inhibit product development. "to He
discounted the majority's reassurance that trademark protection is relatively
weak and that "trademarks are not monopolies,"8' noting that "a restraint on
competition need not be absolute to be effective;" as long as Moen's design is
protectable as trade dress, "Kohler cannot copy Moen's unpatented faucet and
handle unless it knows that Moen will be unable to prove a likelihood of
confusion." 82 In the end, "Moen has no patent, yet remains free from effective
competition in the market for a popular brand of faucet." 83
Judge Cudahy also rejected the possibility that trademark's limiting
doctrines would suffice to vindicate the right to copy. He pointed out that
neither the functionality doctrine nor the "essential for competition" concept is
grounded in the patent law, which is the source of the right to copy.84 Patents
and product-design trade dress may conflict, even though they are defined by
77. Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 647 (7th Cir. 1993) (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
78. See Mark McKenna, (Dys)Functionality, 48 HOUSTON L. REv. 823, 845 (2011) (citing
Judge Cudahy's Kohler dissent in a discussion of this point).
79. Kohler, 12 F.3d at 651 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 647.
81. Id. at 643.
82. Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 650 (7th Cir. 1993) (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
83. Id.




different requirements. The federal right to copy is not extinguished by an
article's acquired distinctiveness or by lack of consumer confusion as to source.
In contrast to the majority opinion, Judge Cudahy's dissent reflected a
view that the patent system is concerned not only with the islands of exclusive
rights it creates but also with the vast remaining sea of copyable material. This
sea of copyable material serves more than the efficiency of the present
marketplace, which is the primary concern of trademark law. This copyable
material promotes the "long-term" success of the market and facilitates
"product development" by providing a starting line for the vigorous
competition that spurs creativity in the commercial sphere. While Judge
Cudahy did not discount the goals of the trademark system, he prioritized the
policy underlying the patent system, which is of explicit constitutional
importance. Trademark rights in product designs are problematic when they
restrain competition in useful articles and designs, even if present-day
consumers are left with a sufficient number of options to avoid monopoly.
Because the right to copy is patent policy, trademark's functionality doctrine
(particularly as interpreted by the Seventh and Federal Circuits at the time of
Kohler) cannot be trusted to represent the patent law's concerns.
III. Vindication for Judge Cudahy? An Incomplete Story
Nearly twenty years after Kohler, trade dress protection of product
configurations continues to vex the courts. While Judge Cudahy's call for a
bright-line rule against trade dress protection for product design (whether
ornamental or utilitarian) has not yet carried the day, the law has certainly
evolved in his direction since the beginning of this century. The Supreme Court
increasingly has stressed the importance of copying for innovation policy, has
clearly disavowed the idea that trademark and patent law are merely distinct
areas of law that can be applied in parallel without concern for their interaction,
and has reined in trade dress protection accordingly. For utilitarian aspects of
product design, the Court has not precluded trade dress coverage entirely, but it
has put in place a tightly constraining functionality doctrine grounded in the
right to copy unpatented products.
In 1995, the Supreme Court in Qualitex rejected an argument that colors
were in such limited supply for aesthetic purposes that they should not be
recognized as trademarks.85 The Court viewed any shortage of aesthetically-
pleasing colors as an "occasional problem," to be addressed by a competition-
focused functionality doctrine:
The upshot is that, where a color serves a significant nontrademark function-whether to
distinguish a heart pill from a digestive medicine or to satisfy the "noble instinct for giving the
right touch of beauty to common and necessary things," G. CHESTERTON, SIMPLICITY AND
TOLSTOY 61 (1912y-courts will examine whether its use as a mark would permit one
85. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 169 (1995).
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competitor (or a group) to interfere with legitimate (nontrademark-related) competition
through actual or potential exclusive use of an important product ingredient.
Tying functionality closely to "put[ting] a competitor at a significant
disadvantage," 87 the Court thus appeared to have adopted the view implicit in
the W. T Rogers opinion (which it cited) that the functionality doctrine was
devoted solely to protecting static competition. Taken together, Two Pesos and
Qualitex seemed to have established a permissive approach to trade dress
protection of product designs.
In 2000, the tide began to turn. In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara
Brothers, Inc.,8 the Court surprised many observers by its skepticism about the
trade dress function of product designs. The case involved the distinctiveness of
Wal-Mart "knock-offs" of Samara's children's clothing "decorated with
appliquds of hearts, flowers, fruits, and the like." 89 The Court distinguished its
decision in Two Pesos, holding that, even though product packaging can be
inherently distinctive, product design cannot.90 While Two Pesos had lauded
the role of trade dress in "foster[ing] competition and the maintenance of
quality,"91 Samara was deeply skeptical of the role of trade dress for product
designs.92 Thus, while word marks and product packaging were used "most
often to identify the source of the product," for designs "consumer
predisposition to equate the feature with the source does not exist" because
"[c]onsumers are aware of the reality that, almost invariably, even the most
unusual of product designs-such as a cocktail shaker shaped like a penguin-
is intended not to identify the source, but to render the product itself more
useful or more appealing." 93 Because product designs are so likely to be
functional and so unlikely to be inherently distinctive, the Court opined, even to
permit producers to bring suits alleging inherent distinctiveness would harm
consumers by "depriv[ing them] of the benefits of competition with regard to
the utilitarian and esthetic purposes that product design ordinarily serves by a
rule of law that facilitates plausible threats of suit against new entrants based
upon alleged inherent distinctiveness." 94 Those who create truly original
product designs, the Court maintained, should make use of design patents and
copyrights.95
86. Id. at 170.
87. Id. at 169.
88. 529 U.S. 205 (2000).
89. Id. at 207.
90. Id. at 212-15 (explaining that product design "almost invariably serves purposes other than
source identification," whereas the d6cor of a restaurant, as in Two Pesos, is "akin to product
packaging," the purpose of which "is most often to identify the source of the product").
91. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 774 (1992).
92. 529 U.S. at 213-14.
93. Id. at 212-13.
94. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 213 (2000).




The Court further reined in the availability of trade dress coverage for
product design almost exactly a year later in TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing
96
Displays, Inc., which considered the functionality doctrine in the context of
an expired utility patent. Marketing Displays, Inc. (MDI) claimed trade dress
protection for its temporary road-sign design, which included a patented "dual-
spring" mechanism for keeping the sign upright in the wind.97 The Sixth
Circuit, viewing the issue as one of assuring competition, had held that the
dual-spring design was non-functional because there were sufficient design
alternatives, such as hiding the dual-spring mechanism or using four springs.98
The fact that trade dress protection would "hinde[r] competition somewhat"
was not enough to demonstrate functionality. 99
The Supreme Court, by contrast, began its analysis squarely with patent
law's right to copy, which it tied directly to the advancement of technology:
Trade dress protection must subsist with the recognition that in many instances there is no
prohibition against copying goods and products. In general, unless an intellectual property
right such as a patent or copyright protects an item, it will be subject to copying. As the Court
has explained, copying is not always discouraged or disfavored by the laws which preserve
our competitive economy.... Allowing competitors to copy will have salutary effects in many
instances. "Reverse engineering of chemical and mechanical articles in the public domain
often leads to signficant advances in technology."m
As it had in Qualitex, the Court reiterated its Inwood rule that a feature is
functional "when it is essential to the use or purpose of the device or when it
affects the cost or quality of the device." t0 Here, however, the Court explicitly
disavowed any link between this rule and "competitive necessity," stating that
"[w]here the design is functional under the Inwood formulation there is no need
to proceed further to consider if there is a competitive necessity for the
feature." 02 It then took an expansive approach to the Inwood requirements,
noting that the "dual-spring design provides a unique and useful mechanism to
resist the force of the wind."t03 Given this, "competitors need not explore
whether other spring juxtapositions might be used. The dual-spring design is
not an arbitrary flourish in the configuration of MDI's product; it is the reason
the device works. Other designs need not be attempted." 04 There was "nothing
96. 532 U.S. 23 (2001).
97. Id. at 26.
98. Id. at 27 (citing Marketing Displays, Inc. v. TrafFix Devices, Inc., 200 F.3d 929, 940 (6th
Cir. 1999)).
99. Id. (quoting Marketing Displays, 200 F.3d at 940).
100. Id. at 29 (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 160
(1989)) (emphasis added).
101. Id. at 33.
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arbitrary about the components of [the] device or the way they are
assembled."10 5
In other words, functionality under the Inwood rule did not require that the
feature at issue be "essential" (i.e. have no close substitutes) in the market for
the device or affect the cost or quality of the device to such a degree that
competitors could not compete effectively using other designs.106 It was enough
that the feature made this particular device work to keep signs from blowing
over in strong winds. A prior patent is "strong evidence that the features therein
claimed are functional," though of course a prior patent is not generally
evidence of competitive necessity.107 Having taken this view of functionality,
the Court concluded that "[t]he Lanham Act does not exist to reward
manufacturers for their innovation in creating a particular device; that is the
purpose of the patent law and its period of exclusivity." 08
Despite this strong affirmation that functionality protects the right to copy
unpatented product configurations, whether or not there is a "competitive
necessity" to do so, the Court muddied the waters by stating in dicta that "[i]t is
proper to inquire into a 'significant non-reputation-related disadvantage' in
cases of aesthetic functionality" of ornamental designs,' 0 9 such as those in
Qualitex. In doing so, the Court seemed to have forgotten its view in Samara
(which, after all, involved ornamental designs) that "almost invariably" product
design is intended "to render the product itself more useful or more
appealing"'"0 (which would seem to suggest that it is almost invariably
functional under the Inwood rule). The TrafFix opinion gives little reason for
distinguishing utilitarian and ornamental designs and says nothing about the
implications of expired design patents. In the wake of TrafFix, lower courts
continue to analyze aesthetic functionality under a competition rubric and even,
in some cases, to treat the existence of a design patent as evidence of non-
functionality.
The story is not yet over, however. While it reined in trade dress coverage
for ornamental designs in Samara, the Supreme Court has yet to grapple fully
with the implications of the right to copy for unpatented ornamental designs,
despite the right to copy's roots in the Sears and Compco ornamental design
cases.
In the meantime, recent cases from Judge Cudahy's own Seventh Circuit
demonstrate the extent to which the utilitarian functionality doctrine can be
deployed to protect the right to copy. In 2003, for example, the Seventh Circuit
upheld a district court's refusal to preliminarily enjoin a competitor from
105. Id. at 34.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 29.
108. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 34 (2001).
109. Id. at 33.




copying Honeywell's registered round thermostat trade dress."' While
expressing skepticism about the competitor's aesthetic functionality argument,
the court suggested three possible ways in which the shape might be functional
on utilitarian grounds: the need to avoid clashes with architectural or decorative
choices; the avoidance of injuries potentially caused by running into sharp
corners; and the possibility that a round configuration might be easier for
people with disabilities, such as arthritis, to use. The first of these, in particular,
seems a bit of a stretch of the concept of "utilitarian" functions.
Coming full circle in several senses, the Seventh Circuit in 2010112
considered the functionality of the very circular beach towel design that Judge
Cudahy had decried in his Kohler dissent as a "horrible example[] of allowing
federal trademark registration to substitute for the grant of a design patent."
The court invalidated the trademark in the circular beach towel on utilitarian
functionality grounds because of the round shape's benefits to "heliotropic
sunbathers-tanners who swivel their bodies in unison with the sun's apparent
motion in order to maintain an even tan" and who did not want to have to
"exert the energy to stand up and reposition their towels every so often."' 14 The
court also found aesthetic functionality in the circular shape because "there are
only so many geometric shapes; few are both attractive and simple enough to
fabricate cheaply."" 5
The court's reasoning was well in line with the perspective on competition
and innovation underlying Judge Cudahy's Kohler dissent:
To put things another way, a trademark holder cannot block innovation by appropriating
designs that under-gird further improvements. Patent holders can do this, but a patent's life is
short; trademarks can last forever, so granting trademark holders this power could
permanently stifle product development. If we found Franek's trademark nonfunctional, then
inventors seeking to build an improved round beach towel would be out of luck. They'd have
to license Franek's mark or quell their inventiveness. That result does not jibe with the
purposes of patent or trademark law." 6
Conclusion
Time will tell how the doctrinal story of functionality for ornamental
product designs evolves. The evolution may depend on how the Supreme Court
comes to view the role of copying in promoting innovation in ornamental
design. The vindication of the general perspective expressed in Judge Cudahy's
Kohler dissent, however, is already clear. The innovation policy embodied in
Ill. Eco Mfg. LLC v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 357 F.3d 649 (7th Cir. 2003).
112. Jay Franco & Sons, Inc. v. Franek, 615 F.3d 855 (7th Cir. 2010).
113. Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 647 (7th Cir. 1993) (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
114. Jay Franco, 615 F.3d at 859.
115. Id. at 861.
116. Id. at 859.
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the patent laws encompasses both the exclusive protection of patented
inventions and the freedom to copy unpatented products. Trade dress protection
of product configurations should not be permitted to impinge upon the
competitive baseline of innovation provided by the right to copy unpatented
designs.
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